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Residential Aged Care policy in Australia – are we learning from evidence? 
 
Introduction 
Over the next decade, the predicted expansion in the Australian population aged older than 70 
years will substantially increase demand for aged care in Australia and require decisions by the 
Australian Government on the nature and structure of the aged care industry. The Australian 
Government subsidises care for older people needing high and low levels of residential care (formerly 
called nursing homes and hostels) and for those still living at home; and these services are 
complementary. While the proportion of those aged over 70 years in residential aged care decreased 
by about 10% between 1999 and 2012 the number of older people living in residential care increased 
substantially over this period (Betts 2014, p. 30). This percentage decline may be a factor of improved 
morbidity and disability in older people over time (Betts 2014, p. 29) and/or an increase in the number 
of home based care services over the past decade (Australian Government Department of Social 
Services 2013a). This reduction in demand is reflected in successive predictions of the impact of 
ageing on health and aged care costs (Australian Treasury 2003, 2007, 2010). Despite the proportional 
use of residential care, the expanding number of people over the age of 70 will continue to increase 
demand for residential aged care. For Australia to meet the anticipated demand, provider 
organisations will need to make substantial investments, the Australian Government will need to 
increase expenditure and consumers can expect to make higher proportional contributions for their 
care. However, changes to the current policy parameters may alter the proportion of these respective 
financial contributions.  
The Australian Government’s expenditure on aged care in 2012/13 was $13.3 billion of which 
$9.2 was spent on residential aged care (Australian Government Department of Social Services 
2013b). The Productivity Commission (2011) predicted the need for an additional 105,000 beds over 
15 years to 2027. At approximately $250,000 to construct a new residential aged care bed in 2013 
(Stewart Brown 2013) this predicted expansion will require an investment of about $26 billion across 
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Australia over this period (Gates & Grayson 2012). The Aged Care Financing Authority (2013, p. 10) 
has separately reported that 74,000 new residential aged care beds will be needed by 2013 at a cost of 
$25 billion. In addition to the replacements of existing beds, one new 140 bed residential aged care 
facility will need to open somewhere in Australia every week for the next ten years to achieve this 
growth, which is approximately twice that of the past decade. This growth will most likely result in 
changes to the structure of the industry, such as the distribution, size and ownership of services. 
Aged care has been subsidised by Australian governments since the 1960s and over this period 
there have been numerous incremental legislative and regulatory changes some of which reversed 
previous policy (Cullen 2003; Le Guen 1993). The current regulatory and quality system has in 
origins in the reforms introduced in the 1980s, which were intended to control government spending, 
reduce the then relative oversupply of aged care beds compared with other countries at the time and 
monitor quality (Cullen 2003; Fine 2007). These reforms introduced planned control over the supply 
of funded beds based on geographical distribution and mandated minimum standards of care as a 
condition of funding. The most recent package of policy changes commenced in 2013 with the 
passage of legislation to enact the reforms outlined in Living Longer. Living Better announcement of 
the previous government (Australian Government Department of Social Services 2014a, 2014b) and is 
expected to continue to be incrementally introduced until 2015/16. These reforms were introduced as 
part of the Government’s response to the findings of the Productivity Commission’s inquiry into the 
industry (Productivity Commission 2011). Both the Productivity Commission’s report and the 
Government’s reforms focused on the issues of capital investment, industry sustainability, 
competition and consumer choice. Neither the Productivity Commission’s report nor the 
Government’s response made more than a passing reference to what the industry will look like in the 
future. What is missing in the public debate is the potential impact that the current and proposed 
reforms will have on structural factors such as ownership, size and location of services and the effect 
these structural changes will have on resident outcomes over the long term. This lack of public debate 
is of interest given the often unfavourable experiences from other countries where there has been 
similar structural change in the provision of social services (Meagher & Cortis 2009).  
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This paper examines the evidence on current industry trends with the aim to stimulate wider 
debate on government policy that is changing the residential aged care sector in Australia. A review of 
the research literature on the relationship between structural factors and performance (financial 
performance, regulatory compliance and efficiency) and quality outcomes for aged care residents is 
reported. The paper then examines trends in the structure of the residential aged care industry over the 
past 10 years. The paper concludes with a recommendation for more evidence-based decision making.  
 
BACKGROUND 
The Aged Care Act 1997 and it Regulations empowers the Minister to control both prices charged 
by providers and the number of funded beds. The regulations establish the maximum amount 
providers can charge residents for care (except for some classes of beds) and accommodation 
(Australian Government Departmernt of Social Services 2014). The legislation restricts government 
funding to ‘approved places’ (beds or community care places), restricts the allocation of ‘approved 
places’ to ‘approved providers’ (licensees) and ‘approves’ the sale of approved places between 
providers (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2012a). Before allocating new 
places to approved providers (at no cost to providers), the Department follows an annual planning 
process. This process estimates the number of new places to be allocated to each planning region, 
based on the number of persons in that region over the aged of 70 years, and recognises special needs 
groups in some locations (Australian Government Department of Social Services 2013b). Following 
the advertising of the new allocations, the Department invites approved providers to bid for the newly 
available ‘approved places’ (beds). The Australian Government’s allocation policy is focused almost 
solely on location and it is silent on other structural factors that may influence the access to and the 
quality of residential care services.  
In 2010 the Australian Government requested that the Productivity Commission (inter alia) 
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‘systematically examine the social, clinical and institutional aspects of aged care in Australia … develop 
regulatory and funding options for residential and community aged care … [and] recommend a path for 
transitioning from the current regulatory arrangements to a new system’ (Productivity Commission 
2011, p. vii).  
In its report to the Government the Commission found that the aged care system was difficult to 
navigate, services and choice were limited, quality and coverage of needs were variable, pricing, 
subsidies and user co-contributions were inconsistent or inequitable (Productivity Commission 2011, 
p. xxii). In addition to the Commission’s findings, a number of recent industry reports have suggested 
that the aged care system was not sustainable in the long term under the structural and financial 
parameters in place prior to the introduction of reforms in 2013 and 2014 (Deloitte Access Economics 
2011; Grant Thornton 2011). The Commission made a number of recommendations that included, 
(inter alia), phasing out the current limits on the number of residential beds a provider can provide by 
removing the government’s control on supply (Productivity Commission 2011, p. xxii). However, 
there was no recommendation made on the preferred future structural features of the residential aged 
care sector in relation to the size of facilities or type of providers that should emerge from this 
liberalisation of the controls on supply.  
The Australian Government has continued to implement the reforms commenced by the former 
Government; for example, major changes to the financial contributions consumers make for 
residential aged care commended on 1 July 2014. While these policy reforms have adopted a number 
of the Productivity Commission’s recommendations, neither the former nor the current Government 
have, as yet, announced any relaxation of the control on supply of residential aged care beds. 
However, the current Government has foreshadowed a continuing pathway towards a more market 
based approach to the distribution of residential aged care services (Fifield 2014). 
As discussed below, the structural factors of interest reported in the international research 
literature include the size of facilities, the size of the organisation providing aged care services and the 
type of provider (for-profit, not-for-profit or government). This interest in structure is consistent with 
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Donabedian’s (1966) conceptual model of the relationship between structure (and other inputs), 
process and outcomes in relation to quality in health care. This framework articulates the relationship 
between structural factors (such as funding, size and ownership) with processes factors (such as 
systems of care) and the outcomes for consumers (Donabedian 1966, 1988, 2005) and is widely used 
when investigating health and aged care system operations and outcomes (Asmus-Szepesi et al. 2011; 
Comondore et al. 2009; Fancott et al. 2010; Massoud et al. 2001; Peacock et al. 2001; World Health 
Organisation 2007).  
The impact of different types of ownership of aged care services has been the subject of a robust 
and growing research literature for over two decades (Davis 1991; Pearson et al. 1993) and is focused 
mostly on the difference between the performance and outcomes for residents of for-profit and not-
for-profit facilities (Castle & Engberg 2007; Comondore et al. 2009; Harrington 2007; Harrington, 
Hauser, et al. 2011; Hillmer et al. 2005; Spector & Takada 1991). While this evidence is dominated 
by studies from the USA, research of a similar nature has been published from Australia (Baldwin et 
al. 2014; Ellis & Howe 2010; Martin 2005; Pearson et al. 1993), Canada (McGregor et al. 2006), 
England (Gage et al. 2009), Israel (Clarfield et al. 2009) and Italy (Garavaglia et al. 2011). The 
general message from the literature from both Australia and overseas is that there are examples of 
excellent and poor aged care service providers to be found in the for-profit, not-for-profit and 
government sectors and that most providers in all sectors meet minimum quality standards. Although 
the findings are not universal, and there are limitations in methods across the research, there have 
been continuing and consistent findings to suggest that residents in not-for-profit facilities have better 
outcomes than those in for-profit facilities. The evidence on indicators of financial performance tends 
to favour the for-profit sector.  
To a lesser extent, independent researchers have also examined the impact of facility size and 
organisation size on performance and resident outcomes (Amirkhanyan, Kim & Lambright 2008; 
Garavaglia et al. 2011; Sojourner et al. 2012; Zinn et al. 2009). Facilities with fewer than 100 beds 
tend to produce more favourable resident outcomes, than larger facilities (Amirkhanyan, Kim & 
Lambright 2008; Ellis & Howe 2010; McGregor et al. 2006; Pearson et al. 1993; Riportella-Muller & 
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Slesinger 1982), although there is variation in the research findings reported (Bravo et al. 1999; Li et 
al. 1996). The relationship between the size of provider organisations with service quality and 
performance has been studied primarily in the USA, where a number of large providers failed 
regulatory compliance during the last two decades. These studies found that homes owned by the 
largest aged care providers (those with 10,000 beds or more) tended to attract a higher rate of quality 
regulation violations per home and these violations tended to be more serious than those of smaller 
organisations. Secondly, homes owned by private equity organisations were more likely to have 
regulatory violations when compared with other ownership types (Harrington, Olney, et al. 2011). 
Larger organisations have also been found to focus on profit maximisation, rather than on quality 
outcomes, and to provide lower nursing staff to resident ratios than do smaller providers (Banaszak-
Holl et al. 2002; Harrington, Hauser, et al. 2011; Kitchener et al. 2008). While there are limitations to 
the application of research findings from one country to another, these findings may be relevant for 
Australia as past policy setting have allowed for the emergence and growth of large aged care 
providers.  
OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH 
The purpose of this paper is to encourage discussion on the issue of the changing shape of the 
residential aged care industry in Australia and the policy parameters that drive these changes. It aims 
to inform the debate by identifying the trends in the structural features of the residential aged care 
sector in Australia and compare these trends with evidence from the international literature. 
METHOD 
Each year, at 30 June, the Australian Government’s Department of Health and Ageing undertakes 
a census of aged care services. The census includes data on a number of structural features of funded 
residential and community aged care services. We merged and analysed the data from ten separate 
census files obtained from the Department, one for each year, between 2002-03 and 2011-12. 
Consistent with the international literature described above, three organisational classes were used to 
define providers – not-for-profit, government and for-profit. The census data revealed there are three 
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not-for-profit organisational types (charitable, religious and community based), two government 
organisational types (local and state), and three for-profit organisational types (private incorporated, 
private non-incorporated and publicly listed). The Australian Government Department of Health and 
Ageing allocates these organisational types in the original data.  
Prior to analysis the data required considerable cleaning to remove duplicates, fill gaps, ensure 
consistency in the naming of services and providers across years, and to ensure services owned by the 
same organisation were correctly coded. Consequently, a unique data base was created whereby the 
totals of aged care beds and providers reported in Table 1 will vary in some respects from results 
published by others (Aged Care Financing Authority 2014). Details of the protocols followed in the 
cleaning process are available from the principal author. Following data cleaning, codes were created 
for ‘service name’, ‘approved provider’, ‘care type’, ‘organisation type’ and ‘remoteness’. Analyses 
were undertaken with the statistical package SPSS (IBM 2013). 
FINDINGS 
Table 1 summarises the major changes across the Australian aged care industry between 2003 and 
2012. Over this period there was a 27% increase in the number of operational residential aged care 
beds across Australia. Although the number of beds has increased substantially, the number of 
services has decreased from 2885 in 2003 to 2865 (<1%) in 2012. (A service is the aged care home 
funded by the Department under the Act; one provider may operate more than one service.) There 
have also been changes in the distribution of beds between ownership classes. In 2003 not-for-profit 
providers operated 62% of all services, state and local governments 12% and for-profit providers 
26%. By 2012 the proportion of not-for-profit providers had declined to 60% and government services 
to 10%, but for-profit providers had increased to 30%.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
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This pattern varies when examined by organisational types. In 2003 services operated by religious 
organisations were more numerous than other types but by 2012 the number of services operated by 
private incorporated bodies was highest. Over the period under review there was a 20% decline in the 
number of services operated by religious organisations, a seven per cent decline in those operated by 
community based services but a 12% increase in the number of services operated by charitable 
entities. There was a 40% decline in local government operated services and a 12% decline in the 
number of services operated by state government bodies. These changes are balanced by a 12% 
increase in the number of services operated by charitable organisation.  
Despite the decline in the number of services operated by charitable, community-based and 
religious organisations there has been an increase of 48%, 28% and 3% respectively in the number of 
beds they operate. The number of beds provided by private incorporated organisations has increased 
by 40% and by publicly listed companies by 1,788%, albeit from a small base. (While beds operated 
by publicly listed companies remain only a small percentage of all beds they are included separately 
in this analysis as they are the fastest growing ownership type and the majority of this growth 
occurred in the three years to 2012). Conversely, beds provided by local government providers 
declined by 33% and by state governments by 7%.  
As a consequence of the growth in residential aged care beds and a decline in the number of 
services the mean size of residential aged care services in Australia has increased by 27.6% over the 
ten years to 2012. This growth varies across organisational types, size categories and locations. 
Services operated by state and local governments have been the smallest and second smallest services 
consistently over the ten year period and remain markedly smaller, on average, than those operated by 
for-profit or not-for-profit providers in 2012. Charitable, community-based, religious and private 
incorporated bodies all increased in average size by more than the mean for the whole of the 
residential aged care industry.  
The number of services with fewer than 60 beds has declined since 2003 and the number of 
services with more than 60 beds has increased. The size category of 21 to 40 beds shows the steepest 
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decline and the size category of over 100 beds the steepest increase. Private incorporated bodies and 
publicly listed companies operate the largest and second largest services on average in 2012. The 
average size of residential aged care services increased in all locations during the period under review, 
except for services in very remote locations, which had a 38% decline in the mean size of services. By 
contrast, there was an increase of 34% in the average size of services in major cities. There appears to 
be a close relationship between percentage change in size and location category as illustrated in 
Figure 1.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Also of interest is the location of services provided by organisational types. As Figure 2 illustrates 
there has been a decline in the number of services operated by not-for-profit organisations in major 
cities and in inner and outer regional locations. Only major cities experienced an increase in the 
number of services provided by for-profit organisations. In 2012 for-profit providers were virtually 
absent from remote and very remote locations and provide fewer services than both not-for-profits 
and government providers in regional locations.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
The ten largest providers of both residential and community aged care services in Australia are 
listed in Table 2. The Victorian Department of Health is the owner of the largest number of aged care 
beds in Australia (although the services are operated by local health authorities). Next in size are the 
Uniting Care NSW and Uniting Care Queensland. Five (50%) of the largest providers are for-profit. If 
all the providers affiliated with the Catholic Church were to be combined as one organisation it would 
be, by far, the largest provider in Australia; however, these providers operate as separate 
organisations. None of these single providers exceeds 10,000 places. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
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DISCUSSION 
Analyses of the census data reveals a 27%, increase in the number of residential aged care beds in 
Australia over the past ten years despite a slight fall in the proportion of older Australians living in 
residential care (Betts 2014). These 40,000 new beds represented a substantial investment by both the 
for-profit and not-for-profit sectors. This steady growth may be attributed to the application of the bed 
allocation formula used by the Department, described above, which assumes that the population age 
profile of a planning region largely drives demand. As the Australian Government has maintained its 
control on the number of approved aged care bed and used the planning formula to fuel growth in the 
industry (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2012b) the current structure of 
the industry can be attributed to government policy and actions. In addition, the Government’s 
projected growth increase could be expected to continue the current trends in growth and the shape of 
the sector over the short to medium term.  
The sector remains dominated by not-for-profit providers of aged care beds, however, there are 
changes occurring in the mix of aged care providers with the steady increase in the percentage of 
services and the number of beds operated by for-profit organisations. There is also growth in the 
average size of facilities. These patterns of provision also differ significantly by location. Trends in 
rural and remote locations are the opposite of trends in the major cities. The number of government 
owned services are declining in most locations but increasing in remote locations and the average size 
of services in large cities is increasing while it is declining in remote locations. 
Given these trends, older people living in major cities may see a reduction in their capacity to 
choose between provider types as, if current trends continue, for-profit providers become the 
dominant provider of care in major cities. In addition, the increase in the average size of services in 
major cities will result in a reduction in the number of small services from which consumers can 
choose. The establishment of larger, better-resourced for-profit services may result in high quality of 
care but could also result in a reduction in the quality of life for those residents who would prefer a 
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smaller, more intimate, not-for-profit service. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in any 
depth the consequences for the quality of care and quality of life that will result from these trends but 
this remains an important area for study and community discussion. 
Aged consumers outside of major cities will continue to have very limited choice if they want to 
choose a for-profit provider and those living in remote/very remote locations will be increasingly 
dependent on state government service providers. The size of services in remote locations is trending 
downwards and these small services may struggle in the future to maintain financial viability without 
additional government funding. Should these trends continue we may see the emergence of a two 
tiered system in Australian aged care based on economic and geographical factors, whereby there is 
one sector operating in major cities and inner regional locations and a different sector operating in 
outer regional and remote locations. In fact the current Assistant Minister for Social Services, the Hon 
Mitch Fifield, has suggested that the system for aged care in rural and remote areas in the future may 
be different from the market-based system that will emerge from current reforms and operate in the 
rest of Australia (Fifield 2014). These comments were made while clarifying the Government’s 
intention to continue to pursue a more market based approach to the administration of the residential 
aged care sector, however, he made no mention of the policy implications of a two tiered system for 
aged care in Australia,  
Recent government commissioned Australian reports have questioned the financial viability of 
small aged care services, particularly those in remote locations (Hogan 2004; Productivity 
Commission 2011). Hogan also made some observations about the relative efficiency of not-for-profit 
providers (2004, p. 74). Therefore it is, interesting, that having made these observations, neither 
Hogan nor the Commission made recommendations for the preferred mix of ownership type, the size 
of services, or the size of provider organisations. In addition, despite the substantial international 
literature, neither report addressed the issue of service quality in relation to structural variables other 
than the capacity of most services to meet minimum standards. Recent industry-funded benchmark 
research and other investigative reports (Ansell, Dovey & Vu 2012; Stewart Brown 2013) suggest that 
some residential aged care services may be too small to be financially viable and recommend facilities 
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have more than 60 beds to maximise profits and viability. A 60 bed facility is currently above the 
average size of Australian residential aged care services in all locations (Ansell, Dovey & Vu 2012; 
Stewart Brown 2013). None of these reports address the impact on quality of care or quality of life 
arising from an increase in the size of services.  
The short review of the international literature summarised above suggests that there are 
differences in outcomes for residents between services operated by not-for-profit and for-profit 
providers (not-for-profit providers deliver higher quality of care) and services of different sizes 
(smaller services produce better quality). The extent to which these findings apply in Australia is 
unclear, since there has been little similar research in Australia. The evidence suggests that for-profit 
residential aged care services have a lower nurse to resident staffing ratio than not-for-profit services 
(Martin 2005) and this is consistent with international evidence (Castle & Engberg 2007). There is 
also evidence to suggest for-profit services are more at risk of failing to achieve minimum standards 
in Australia (Baldwin et al. 2014; Ellis & Howe 2010), which is also consistent with overseas findings 
(Comondore et al. 2009). Australia has a different structural patter to other countries, which may limit 
comparability. It also lacks a national database of quality indicators, which could be used to monitor 
changes in outcomes related to changes in structure. In view of the limited available evidence in 
Australia, policies that will significantly change the structure of the aged care industry should be 
approached with caution least a different structure, which may be difficult to reverse, results in less 
desirable outcomes.  
Recent industry funded private sector consultancy reports (Deloitte Access Economics 2011; 
KPMG 2013) suggest that the for-profit sector is better placed than the not-for-profit sector to take 
advantage of the expansion of the industry and the recently introduced reforms. This proposition 
reflects the perception that for-profit providers are more focused on their business objective and 
exhibit a greater level of comfort with debt, compared with the not-for-profit sector. These factors 
result in the for-profit provider’s easier access to capital to fund expansion. Based on this economic 
advantage, it is reasonable to anticipate that the number of beds and services operated by for-profit 
providers will continue existing trends and grow substantially over the next ten years, and faster than 
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the not-for-profit sector. This growth may result in for-profit providers becoming the largest type of 
residential aged care provider. Should for-profit providers dominate the industry in the future this 
would mirror the experience of the industry in comparable countries. For example, in the USA, during 
the last few decades of the twentieth century there was a shift from predominately not-for-profit to 
predominately for-profit provision of aged care (Kaffenberger 2000). In New Zealand the percentage 
of services operated by for-profit providers increased from 65% to 76% between 2005 and 2009 
(Grant Thornton 2010), in Ireland the beds operated by for-profit providers increased from 22% in 
1998 to 69% in 2013 (Hickey 2014) and in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 2005 the 
proportion of beds in the for-profit sector rose from 18% to 90% (Johnson, Rolph & Smith 2010).  It 
seems reasonable to expect that if government policy articulated similar expected changes in Australia 
it would spark community debate. 
A reason why Australia has not followed the trends in the pattern of ownership seen in other 
comparable countries may be a result of the continuing tight government control over the supply of 
beds. This system of control on supply appears to have three principal objectives: to maintain control 
on the growth in government financial outlays on aged care; to prevent oversupply (as occurred in the 
1980s); and to achieve an equitable distribution of services geographically across Australia. The third 
objective has effectively been achieved (Australian Government Department of Social Services 
2013b) and the expansion of community aged care services may have lessened the need for control on 
oversupply by reducing some of the demand for residential care. However, while the Australian 
Governments’ policy has strictly controlled the type, number and location of newly allocated beds 
(Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2013) it appears to be indifferent to other 
structural factors. These factors are the size of organisations to which allocations are made, the size of 
the facility that is likely to result from the allocation and the profit status of the approved providers to 
whom the places are allocated.  
The question, therefore, arises as to whether the Government has intended that the structural 
changes evident in current trends will emerge, given that it has control on supply. Neither the 
previous, nor the current, Australian Government has indicated a preference on the future mix of 
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service providers, the growth of large providers, or the size of facilities. This suggests that policy 
makers, even in the light of the available evidence, have enabled these trends to continue through their 
silence, or are at least comfortable with the direction in which the industry is headed.  
Policy makers will argue that the Government is purchasing services from approved providers and 
that they are indifferent to the size of a service, or the type or size of provider, as long as the services 
provided meet minimum standards (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 
2012a). This position appears to accept the proposition that the ‘market place’ will determine the mix 
of providers (Meagher & Cortis 2009). However, this position is questionable while the Government 
retains control over supply and, consequently, severely limits the capacity of a market to emerge. 
While the Government controls supply it seems reasonable to argue that the shape of the industry is a 
result of its policies. 
The question also emerges as to the role of not-for-profit aged care providers. Government 
subsidies are the same for both for-profit and not-for-profit providers, but successive governments 
provide not-for-profit providers with favourable treatment in relation to taxation and other benefits. 
This suggests that the intention of this policy is that not-for-profit providers have a different role to 
for-profit providers; such as covering gaps in service delivery arising from market failure. For this 
reason, it seems reasonable to expect that the Australian Government will be able to articulate a vision 
for the relative mix and distribution of for-profit and not-for- profit aged care providers.  
Currently, Australian based evidence to guide decisions on the shape the aged care industry is 
minimal and the inevitable differences between countries limits the extent to which Australia should 
rely solely on the research evidence from other countries. While the Australian Government cannot 
avoid making funding and allocation decisions, these decisions should be based on the best available 
evidence and where that is not available, the Government should pursue policies that will generate the 
evidence needed for informed policy making. What the analysis of the structural trends of Australia’s 
aged care industry has shown is that there are clear trends in the structure of the industry and these 
trends are under the control of the Australian Government. While maintaining this control successive 
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Australian governments have remaining silent on their preferences for the future shape of the industry 
and there had been little community debate on what is preferred. There is clearly a need to obtain 
more evidence on the impact structural change will have on the quality of care and the performance of 
the industry. There is also a clear need for wider community debate on the future shape of the 
residential aged care industry in Australia. 
Limitations of this research and notes on the data 
The Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing originally collected and assembled 
the data accessed for this review and the authors have not validated their accuracy and reliability. A 
conservative approach was taken to the data cleaning procedures which removed identified 
duplications and errors in the original data entry and this approach may have resulted in more services 
and providers in the final data set than actually exists.  
Conclusions 
Over the ten years to 2012 the residential aged care industry in Australia has shown steady growth 
but also signs of a modest trend towards consolidation, evidenced by the reduction in the number of 
service providers and the increase in the average size of facilities. The result is fewer, but larger, 
services in major cities and smaller, often government-operated services in outer regional and remote 
locations. Continuation of these trends may result in a two-tiered system of residential aged care in 
Australia in the future with non-urban consumers offered a different system of care to those in major 
cities and inner regional areas. There has also been increased proportional provision of residential 
aged care beds by for-profit providers and this trend is likely to continue and may result in the for-
profit sector dominating provision of care, at least in some segments of the market. The Australian 
Government has maintained a tight control over the supply of aged care beds over recent decades, 
leading to the conclusion that it is either comfortable with the current trends in the aged care industry, 
responsible for them, or disinterested in them. However, the international evidence on the structural 
factors that are most likely to lead to a residential aged care industry that provides efficient services 
and high quality care does not fully support these trends. A prudent future approach should be to 
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develop a more transparent and informed policy, introduce the routine collection of data on outcomes 
to inform policy and actively foster research into the structural feature that are most likely to achieve  
desired quality of care and outcomes for Australian residential aged care consumers. 
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Figure 1 Percentage changes in mean size of residential aged care services by location; Australia 2003-2012 
 
 
Figure 2 Number of services by organisational type and location; Australia 2003 and 2012 
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Table 1 Residential aged care beds, services and average size: Australia 2003-12 
 
2003 2012 
% 
Change 
2003-12 
 No. % No. %  
Number of residential aged care beds 
High care places 73,920  93,424  26% 
Low care places 74,267  94,350  27% 
Charitable 21,888  32,370  48% 
Community based 19,632  25,230  29% 
Religious 48,812  50,316  3% 
Total not-for-profit 90,332 61% 107,916 57% 19% 
Local government 2,816  1,888  -33% 
State government 9,646  8,934  -7% 
Total government 12,462 8% 10,822 7% -13% 
Private Incorporated and non-incorporated 45,250  63,518  40% 
Publicly Listed Company 145  2,737  1,788% 
Total-for-profit 45,395 31 66,255 36% 46% 
Total residential aged care places 148,187 100% 187,774 100% 27% 
Number of residential aged care services 
Charitable 404  454  12% 
Community based 470  437  -7% 
Religious 903  724  -20% 
Total not-for-profit 1,779 62% 1,612 60% -9% 
Local government 83  50  -40% 
State government 267  236  -12% 
Total state government 350 12% 286 10% -18% 
Private Incorporated and non-incorporated 754  788  5% 
Publicly Listed Company 2  38  1,800% 
Total for-profit 756 26% 826 30% 9% 
Total residential aged care services 2,883 100% 2,725 100% -1% 
  Average size of residential aged care services by organisational type 
Charitable 53.92  70.95  32% 
Community based 41.78  57.45  37% 
Religious 54.06  69.53  29% 
Local government 33.93  37.00  9% 
State government 36.13  31.79  -12% 
Private Incorporated and non-incorporated  60.08  80.74  34% 
Publicly Listed Company 72.50  72.03  -1% 
All residential aged care services 51.36  65.54  28% 
  Average size of services by location 
Major City 56.88  76.26  34% 
Inner Regional 47.18  59.97  27% 
Outer Regional 38.39  42.94  12% 
Remote 24.30  25.79  6% 
Very Remote 24.25  15.02  -38% 
All residential aged care services 51.36  65.54  26% 
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Table 2 Largest aged care providers in Australia 2012 
Service provider Class/type Beds Community 
places 
total 
Victorian Department of Health 
(provided through local health services) 
Govt/state 6,100 1735 7,835 
Uniting Care NSW NFP/religious 5,850  2,735  8,585 
Uniting Care Qld  NFP/religious 5,220  2,308  7,528 
Bupa FP/private incorporated body 5,600 0 5,600 
Regis group FP/private incorporated body 4,482 45 4,527 
RSL Care NFP/charitable 3,400 973 4,373 
Domain Principal  FP/ private incorporated body 4,100 0 4,100 
Japara  FP/ private incorporated body 2,740 0 2,740 
Allity (Archer Capital) FP/private non-incorporated body 2,290 0 2,290 
Catholic Healthcare (NSW) NFP/religious 2,100 1,025 3,125 
Catholic Church (provided through 
numerous separate organisations) 
NFP/mixed religious and 
charitable 
19,000 8,000 27,000 
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